



# NAVIGATOR

---

## “Coalition Defies Mission” Multilateral Conflict Resolution at Times of Geopolitical Contestation

**Authors:** Malte Brosig (University of the Witwatersrand)  
and John Karlsrud (Norwegian Institute for  
International Affairs)



February 2026

---

NAVIGATOR working papers, second series  
WP 8 | D. 2

Horizon Europe | Grand agreement n°101094394



# Abstract and Authors

The response to armed conflict is undergoing a fundamental transformation. For long it has been mission-based in which countries under the administrative leadership of the UN and/or regional organization pool resources and deploy multinational missions with the aim of stabilizing countries and building sustainable peace. This model is in decline if not phasing out. It is increasingly supplanted by ad hoc coalitions appearing as a more flexible instruments at times of multilateralism in crisis. This paper explores the demise of mission-based conflict resolution using a rational institutionalist perspective building on search and surge costs. It focusses explicitly on the EU as one of the traditional supporters of mission-based solutions and explores how the EU is positioning itself between the need to develop more agile and flexible instruments for conflict resolution while not undermining already challenged multilateral organizations. Empirically the paper focuses on the decline of peacekeeping missions and the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as the EU's most important instrument for conflict response.

**Keywords:** EU Security Governance, Search Costs, European Peace Facility, Multilateralism, Ad hoc coalitions (AHCs)

**Citation Recommendation:** Brosig, Malte and Karlsrud, John (2026). "Coalition Defies Mission. Multilateral Conflict Resolution at Times of Geopolitical Contestation". NAVIGATOR working paper, WP. 8, D. 2 (February), pp. 1-25. <https://eunav.eu/>

---

**Malte Brosig** is Professor in International Relations at the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. He joined the Department in 2009 after he received his PhD from the University of Portsmouth. His main research interests focus on issues of international organizations and security in Africa and Europe.

**John Karlsrud** is Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. He works on peacekeeping, humanitarian action and global governance more broadly. He is the Coordinator of NAVIGATOR, a Horizon Europe project exploring changes in global cooperation across a range of issues.

# Table of content

- Introduction..... 1
- Search and Surge Costs of New Coalition Formation..... 2
- Anatomy of a Decline..... 5
- The European Peace Facility..... 11
- A Mixed Mission Approach..... 16
- Conclusions..... 18
- References..... 19
- Annex..... 24

# Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, conflict resolution has predominantly been organized in multilateral frameworks and taken the form of mission deployments operating with civilian, military and/or political mandates. These missions were characterized by a high degree of formalistic multilateralism in which international and regional organizations directly design and manage these missions. The emphasis was placed on integrating member state resources effectively into a mission structure and implementing scripted solutions mostly developed by secretariat staff. The UN has been the main organizer and facilitator of this kind of intervention, but the model has also been replicated on the regional and sub-regional level in Africa, Europe and beyond. This model of conflict resolution is undergoing substantial transformation if not coming to an end. Mission-driven conflict resolution is increasingly replaced by coalition politics (Karlsruud and Reykers 2025). The UN, as the central provider of peacekeeping missions hardly starts new ones, practically all existing missions are scaling down or phasing out. The UN in 2025 under the initiative UN80 is planning for major structural reforms.<sup>1</sup> While the process is ongoing a significant reduction of staffing levels (by 20%) and budget cuts (20%) are likely to accelerate the departure from large and comprehensive peacekeeping missions. Within major EU member states institutional restructuring is taking place too. The German Foreign ministry cuts its headquarters staffing levels by 8% and has dissolved the Department for Crisis Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Humanitarian Aid. These inner-structural reforms, the largest in decades, aim at refocusing the foreign service on key national security and economic interests while down-scaling Germany's traditionally strong emphasis on multilateral conflict resolution approach (Die Zeit, 25. November 2025).

In the UN the potential dissolution of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and creation of a single Department of Political Affairs and Peace Operations mirrors the restructuring of foreign offices as those in Germany at national level. It not only equals a downscaling of the instrument of peace missions within the UN's internal structures but also curtails the UN from managing large and complex missions.<sup>2</sup> Richard Gowan (2025) aptly called the UN80 reform plans as 'doing less with less'. This means in situations in which a recent draw-down and exit occurred, such as in Sudan and Mali accompanied by more violence after peacekeepers left, a re-deployment using the same format is highly unlikely (Tull 2023). The likelihood of UN operations in theatres where there is strong interest from major powers, such as in Gaza and Ukraine, is also low. In this context, we focus on how the EU is adjusting to this substantially changing security architecture. Undoubtedly, the model of addressing armed conflicts through multilateral missions is in transformation with many phasing out and fewer missions being deployed. Thus, this paper is exploring how the EU is responding to

---

<sup>1</sup> "UN80 Initiative". Available at: [\[6\] If all times are extraordinary, why make fiscal rules for ordinary times?](#)

<sup>2</sup> For reform plans, see UN80 Task Force memo: [https://healthpolicy-watch.news/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Consolidated\\_ideas\\_realignments\\_restricted\\_2504081.pdf](https://healthpolicy-watch.news/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Consolidated_ideas_realignments_restricted_2504081.pdf)

# Search and Surge Costs of New Coalition Formation


Traditionally international institutions are meant to reduce transaction costs among their members (Keohane 1984, Keohane and Martin 1995). Pooling of resources, creation of routinized practices and inter-governmental control, for example through veto rights, offer states better 'returns' than acting alone or bilaterally. This argument is based on rational choice institutionalism (Tallberg 2002, Snidal 2002). States are expected to hold strategic interests and calculate alternative options and select the most beneficial one. For issues that regularly (long-term) demand a response and affect a group of countries international institutions can be expected to offer a collective action benefit. Further on, historical institutionalism argues that once established institutions tend to be sticky, resist change and create high exit costs (Pierson 1996). In combination this locks-in countries into stable multilateral cooperation when using international institutions.

However, the existing crisis of multilateralism warrants a reassessment of the utility of existing institutions. If they change in producing beneficial outcomes or strategic interests of state members change, a misalignment emerges between the resources invested and returns received. When there is gridlock, the institutions that were set up to reduce transaction costs can instead increase them (Sending et al. 2024). Furthermore, the phenomenon of institutional lag can emerge in situations in which the expected positive return from cooperation and pooling of resources is not materializing within expected timelines. In such situations institutional solutions appear in mismatch with the initial issue/problem for which they were set up. Long-term problems are particularly prone to institutional lag as institutions often tend to change in a post hoc manner but not simultaneously with the respective issue they address (Hale 2024 102-127).

The mismatch between institutionalized solutions at hand and the issue to be addressed can widen further if confronted with fast moving crises in combination with geopolitical gridlock. This incentivises the search for alternative formats which can be categorised as a form of cost category. This could either result in relocating activities from one institution and shifting to another, or it requires the setting up of alternative institutional arrangements better tailored to the needs of the main stakeholders. As the setting up of a new formal institution requires a high investment of resources following a situation in which stakeholders experienced poor institutional returns, it is reasonable to assume that they display heightened cost awareness. In this context, surge costs is an additional crucial dimension. It refers to the resources necessary to initialize and activate new or dormant institutional frameworks. The understandable reluctance to accept high surge costs fosters tendencies to look for and create more informal and temporary arrangements. Loose forms of cooperation appear as attractive because they are associated with lower running costs (Vabulas and Snidal 2020, Abbot and Faude 2021, Reykers and Karlsrud et al. 2023, Faude and Karlsrud 2025).

Corresponding to this trend one can observe a wide proliferation of ad hoc coalitions (AHCs) and increasing number of participating countries (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Number of Ad Hoc Coalitions and number of country members



Source: Maglia, Cristiana, Karlsrud, John, & Reykers, Yf (2025). "Military Ad Hoc Coalitions and Their Role in International Conflict Management: Insights from the ADHOCISM Dataset" *International Peacekeeping*, 32(3), p. 372.

Some of the common points of critique against international peacekeeping missions refers to the relative slow and bureaucratic response to armed conflicts by international organizations such as the UN. Its comprehensive approach, too wide mandate and lengthy mobilization of resources through its members often stand in contrast to relatively little progress in achieving stable peace (Lundgren, Oksamytna, Coleman, 2020). In fact, nearly a quarter of a century of peacekeeping reform efforts starting with the Brahimi report in 2000 to the UN80 reform did not succeed in designing a more effective instrument. At its core it remains a fairly formalistic, rather inflexible and normatively driven instrument. Independent of the question if missions would be more successful with the opposite (informal, flexibly, technical), member states increasingly perceive formal bureaucratic procedures, comprehensive normative scripts and open multilateral inclusiveness as constraints to effective action. Such a perception is not unwarranted given political tensions in many formal organizations and declining trust in the normative framework.

Applying the search cost perspective implies to survey alternative options to the traditional model of mission-based conflict resolution. Such an alternative option would create lower costs if it avoids political blockades for example by turning to club-based action in contrast to all-inclusive global or regional organizations. This would entail focusing more on the technical aspects of a problem instead of applying a comprehensive normative approach and through bypassing formal decision-making procedures to gain more flexibility.

Because such a peacemaking instrument does not exist within the UN, AU or EU it would need to be created anew which brings in the surge cost dimension. In this context, AHCs which have been defined: “as autonomous arrangements with a task-specific mandate established at short notice for a limited period of time” (Reykers et al 2023: 727). They are potentially the best example of an instrument with low surge costs and better control of provided resources for a specific task. We therefore assume that the EU at least partially shifts its resources to AHCs because they offer a better chance of the wanted returns. The following section provides an overview of the current state of decline of mission-based conflict resolution.

# Anatomy of a Decline

Initially the experience of genocide and war crimes in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) strongly contributed to the growth and dominance of mission-based conflict resolution after the end of the Cold War. Deploying peacekeeping missions to armed conflicts almost became a habitual practice of the UN. This trend is now being discontinued. The crisis of multilateralism is visible on many fronts. With mission-based conflict resolutions we mean the deployment of military, civilian or political missions which integrate member state resources (troops, funding expertise) in support of furthering peace in armed conflicts under the administration of an international authority, usually the UN or regional organization. The intention behind this model is to assist countries in need with politically impartial, internationally legitimate conflict resolution and ideally preventing the relapse into conflict at the end of a mission. Furthermore, peace missions are based on collective burden-sharing and international solidarity building a pathway out of a violent past. A division of labour emerged in which wealthy countries, traditionally from the global North, cover most of the financial costs while developing countries deployed most of the international personnel. Around 60% of the UN peacekeeping budget comes from just eight Western countries. However, it should be noted that China has rapidly advanced to now de facto becoming the top contributor to UN peacekeeping with 20% of the budget, as the US, with 22% of the budget, is withholding its funding.<sup>3</sup> The US in early 2026 also announced its withdrawal from the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Fund (White House, 7. Jan. 2026). All top ten troop contributing countries are developing nations.<sup>4</sup> Regional organizations complemented large and comprehensive UN missions (e.g. in Sudan, DRC, Mali, etc.) with smaller deployments. While the AU and African organizations often deployed in advance of a UN mission, the EU tends to deploy smaller and more technically focused operations. A security regime complex emerged in which many aspects of conflict resolution were institutionalized and mission deployments were considered a standard response (Brosig 2013). Different actors complemented each other by contributing different resources. Cross-institutional linkages emerged between the UN, EU and AU. This resulted for example in joint meetings of the UNSC and AU-PSC or joint declarations of the AU and EU. This system worked well for around a decade (roughly 2007-2017) in which the three organizations deployed a high number of missions requiring better technical coordination among themselves.

The high number of deployments coincided with the rise of the EU and AU as viable security actors giving each other support. The EU's investment in African institution building was crucial for operationalizing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which further enabled more mission deployments. The EU could partly out-source difficult and dangerous missions to an African partner, while the AU and RECs received critical

---

<sup>3</sup> Scale of assessments: <https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/scale.shtml>. For an overview of which states have paid their dues in full, see <https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/honourroll.shtml>

<sup>4</sup> For up to date data visit: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors> for stats on troop contributions and <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded> for the budget.

external resources to launch missions even in areas in which no reliable peace was likely to be established. Both relied on the UN for formal legitimacy in the form of UN authorization but also operating in the shadow of the much larger and more comprehensive UN missions. Between 2010 and 2017 the UN deployed more than 100,000 troops (annually) in peacekeeping operations. In April 2015 mission deployments reached a historic high of 107,805 troops. Ten years later it is only at 61,185 – a reduction of 43%.<sup>5</sup>

Additionally, the golden era of peacekeeping has been carried by an overly optimistic ‘peacekeeping works’ trope in academia and policy circles (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård 2019, Fortna 2008), and little geopolitical tension within the UN, AU and EU. Both has changed substantially. The return of great power rivalry to the UN Security Council started a trend of creeping polarization to conflict areas which previously were seen as unproblematic. The willingness to deploy missions to armed conflicts is at its lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

Sadly, the reduction of peacekeeping missions is not the result of successful mission completion. Globally state-based armed conflict has increased. From 2010 to 2024 the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) counts an increase from 30 to 61 state-based conflicts (Rustad 2025). The termination of MINUSMA in Mali with nearly 16,000 personnel in 2023 and UNAMID in Sudan with around 15,000 staff exiting in 2020 had mostly negative effects. In Mali insurgents re-conquered large parts of the country and even starting a siege on Bamako and Sudan is experiencing the worst violence since the 2004 massacres in Darfur (Kurtz 2025, Tull 2023b). Consequently, Fath, Lacher and Verhoven (2025: 13) have concluded that in Africa the decline of mission-based conflict resolution is accompanied by a “rise of interventions by non-Western powers [which] have contributed to growing levels of violence on the continent.”

While the overall number of UN missions between 2010 and 2025 fluctuated between 16 and 23, not displaying a straight downward trend, many missions experience a significant reduction of troop levels. At the beginning of 2026 only three missions have staffing levels beyond 10,000 (CAR, DRC, South Sudan). No other regional organization is currently deploying large missions. Furthermore, no new large missions have been authorized since 2014 and hardly any new UN missions are planned or deployed. Operations such as those in Haiti and Gaza rather fall in the category of AHCs authorized by the UN Security Council but not wearing a blue beret.

The decline of mission-based conflict resolution also results from growing dysfunctionality of the UN Security Council. While the total number of formal Council meetings reached a record high of 305 in 2024, the number of adopted resolutions is in decline.<sup>6</sup> In 2016 77 were adopted but only 44 in 2025, the lowest number in more than 30 years while the council had the highest number of meetings since the early 1990s. Additionally, more and more resolutions are adopted without consensus (Brosig 2026). In 2025 more

---

<sup>5</sup> Troop deployment data: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/00-front\\_page\\_msr\\_september\\_2025.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/00-front_page_msr_september_2025.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> For a breakdown of annual council outputs and meetings see: <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/highlights>

than a third (38.6%) were adopted without consensus, undermining the overall authority of the Council and constituting another post-Cold war low point (Security Council Report 2025). Seven resolutions were vetoed in 2024, a record number since the end of the Cold War. In other words, the policy space for authorizing missions has declined significantly. This is becoming visible in the increasing number of conflicts in which the Council is not or only minimally engaged, such as in Ethiopia, Gaza, Mali, Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Yemen.

Alongside peacekeeping missions, the Security Council regularly adopts sanction regimes encompassing arms bans but also sanctioning individuals involved in war crimes and as a political pressure tool against peace spoilers. With the decline of these missions but increasing proliferation of armed conflict impunity and inaction toward war crimes becomes gradually normalized (Vorrath 2024). The system of open-ended sanctions faces significant pushback and, in the end, weakening the role of the UN.

However, the decline of mission-based conflict resolution is not exclusively the result of increasing power rivalry visible in an increasingly dysfunctional UN Security Council. Many of the large missions did not succeed in bringing peace or stabilizing countries. Missions in CAR, Mali, Somalia (AU), South Sudan or Sudan armed conflict did not abate with mission deployments but sometimes even escalated with peacekeepers on the ground (Brosig and Sempijja 2018). The lacking output performance led to a gradual erosion of trust in the efficacy of the instrument which can now be exploited by actors who disapprove the liberal underpinnings of the instrument. In fact, the inability if not unwillingness of the international community to fill the finance gap at the UN triggered by the Trump administration, is quite telling. If the instrument would have worked well, why is there no willingness to compensate for the US funding gap? Trust in the instrument itself is eroding for some time and the US' ideological turnaround is accelerating this trend but is not solely responsible for it. The absence of recent success stories of peacekeeping missions creates institutional lag.

In the case of Mali, accumulated public dissatisfaction led to the toppling of the civilian government and its replacement with a military government which terminated all international missions in the country. Lacking success of peacekeeping missions in complex conflicts and at times very violent environments has eroded the liberal peace paradigm to such an extent that it has become vulnerable to non-liberal contestation. As a consequence, multilateral peacekeeping missions are increasingly replaced by AHCs and bilateral security arrangements (Fath, Lacher, Verhoven 2025).

In West Africa, which has hosted several dozens of peacekeeping missions over the last decades, European influence has sharply declined, mostly because of France's forced military withdrawal from the region. In only three years (2022-2025), Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso experienced military coups and demanded a withdrawal of French troops and terminated bilateral defence agreements with France. But even countries which did not experience coups such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Ivory Coast and Senegal expelled French troops. In fact, the last years have seen the end of France's *pré carré* style foreign policy towards Africa, marking a historical

turning point after decades of maintaining a strong position in the region (Ricard, Antouly and Guichaoua 2025). This substantial shift, often standing in the shadow of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the more radical anti-globalist second Trump administration, has a direct impact on the EU and on mission-based conflict resolution.

In Western Africa France was centrally important for organizing multilateral support for peace missions in Francophone Africa. It was regularly the sole penholder for UN Security Council resolutions drafting mission mandates. Within the EU it was essential for activating other EU countries to contribute to French-led security initiatives which often resulted in the deployment of an EU mission (DRC, CAR, Mali). French military presence prepared the ground for multilateral missions of the UN and regional organizations. Operation Barkhane (2014-2021) was France's largest military operation in Africa since the Algerian war. Task Force Takuba (2020-2022) succeeded it and consisted of 13 European countries. France and the EU were also instrumental for the setting up of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (2017-2022), a regional military force supposed to fight terrorism.

The wave of military coups (eight since 2020) has not only diminished France's military presence in West Africa but also accelerated the decline of multilateral peacekeeping. The UN and EU terminated their missions in Mali. But also regional African organizations find opposition to peacekeeping missions. This is most visible in Western Africa where three military governments (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) jointly left the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and set up their own organization, the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES). This move was mainly motivated by fending off ECOWAS interference which quickly implemented sanctions and discussed plans for intervening directly. De facto, in any of the conflict hotspots there is now no local government interested in asking for the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission or regional organization which is able or willing to advance a forward mission which could later be converted into a UN one flanked by the EU.

For Europe this means a considerable loss of influence in a region which continues to suffer from armed insurgents, as well as drug and human-trafficking. A geopolitical component is visible too. The demise of mission-based conflict resolution coincides within an increase in mercenary activities. While Russia's Africa Corps, formerly known as the Wagner Group, did not stage any of the coups, they receive military support from Moscow, consolidating authoritarian rule at the cost of multilateral peace efforts. Beyond Russia, there is a visible shift away from clearly centering peace efforts in Africa within multilateral organizations and moving to individual state actors (Dersso and Tefesehet 2025). This makes a quick return to the status quo ante rather unlikely. The illiberal political shift is not confined to single isolated countries but starts to spillover into multilateral cooperation (Cheeseman, Bianchi and Cyr 2026).

On the normative side, the liberal peace paradigm is predominantly attractive because it consists of a promise of a better tomorrow (end of conflict, transitional justice, building of inclusive political institutions etc.). Conflicts are expected to be solved through a modernisation of society with

the help of international expertise which is politically impartial and non-partisan because it is multilaterally administrated and not dominated by a single (hegemonic) state but abstract international norms and assistance. With the lack of progress towards peace, the belief in the viability of the instrument has received a hard knock, just at the time geopolitical tensions among great powers are increasing. In Mali popular disapproval was not only directed against France and the UN but also regional African organizations such as ECOWAS and the AU receiving a low approval rate (Afrobarometer 2025).


Traditionally the EU has been an ardent supporter of ‘mission’ solutions, often deploying alongside the UN, lending crucial capacity building assistance for the AU and being at the forefront of authorizing and designing mission mandates at the UN Security Council. Since the beginning of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU has deployed more than 40 missions.<sup>7</sup> In 2025 20 of these are in operation, the majority are civilian (12) and eight are military ones (land-based 5, naval 3). However, the resources used for these missions are relatively moderate and small in size (see table 1). Some of the larger UN missions were deploying more than four times the number of personnel than all of the current EU deployments together. All 20 missions only make up for less than 4,000 staff (see annex, table 1).

In peacekeeping the EU tends to take on a supporting role. All land-based military missions are deployed alongside other missions, usually from the UN. Since the beginning of the CSDP mission deployments around 20 years ago, one can also observe a decline in numbers. When looking at five-year intervals a record number of new missions were deployed (12) between 2001-2005. These numbers started to decline after 2015. Between 2016 and 2020 only four missions were added. Increasing geopolitical competition with Russia in Eastern Europe led to an increase again. Over the period of 2021 to 2025 one can observe both the closing down of many EU missions but also the opening of several new ones (7) (see figure 2). Undoubtedly, the model of addressing armed conflicts through multilateral missions is in transformation.

---

<sup>7</sup> An overview of current and past missions can be found on the EU’s website: [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations\\_en#11930](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#11930)

Figure 2: Deployed EU missions over five-year period



Source: author calculation, data drawn from the EU External Action Service (EEAS) website: [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en) accessed 17 December 2025.

The traditional EU approach of sending out rather small and highly specialized missions made sense in the context of large UN deployments and African regional activism within functioning multilateral frameworks. As these parameters have changed and partly ceased to exist, the EU needs to adjust to these new realities. But what alternative formats, if any, are available and how can they be evaluated?

For the EU and its member states several dilemmas emerge. Should they endorse radical change and abandon the mission-based model risking a further deepening of the crisis of multilateralism? Or should they defend and try to reform it at times when political tensions with its closest security partner, the US, have reached a historic low point? Furthermore, geopolitical competition with Russia and the US's lacklustre interest in European security has given the EU the opportunity to sharpen its geopolitical profile (Håkansson 2024). However, massive investments in territorial defence in the context of a US disengagement in European security can also shrink available resources and political interest in traditional multilateral peacekeeping. There is possibly no satisfying answer to these questions, resulting in pressure for institutional structures and political arrangements to be modified and transformed. This is exactly what is happening at the moment. In times of global order transformation surveying ones options is crucial for identifying opportunities and taking decisions how resources can be used most effectively. In the following section we contribute to this by advancing a search/surge cost perspective for evaluating alternative models for the EU in promoting peace and security. We explore to which extent the EU has indeed shifted from prioritising support for mission-based solutions to AHCs.

# The European Peace Facility

In late 2017 then EU High Representative Mogherini proposed the establishment of the EPF (Mogherini 2017). The intention was a funding volume of €10bn over seven years (2021-2027) which would “significantly increase the EU’s ability to financially support operations with defence implications” referring to both EU missions as well as support for partners (European Commission, 2018). On March 2021 the EPF was formally established as an inter-governmental and off-budget instrument (Council of the EU 2021). It is thus an instrument of EU member states providing and controlling funds the EU can make available for its own missions as well as for third parties. The establishment of the EPF marks a seminal change for the EU. It constitutes a substantial shift from supporting institutionalized forms of conflict resolution fostering the above-described mission-based approach to supporting ad hoc arrangements operating in parallel and sometimes outside established institutional frameworks. This becomes best visible when comparing it with its predecessor, the African Peace Facility (APF). Thus, this section offers a comparison between the APF and EPF followed by an exploring for current EPF activities.

The APF for a long time functioned as a capacity building tool for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which is the AU’s formal institutional framework addressing armed conflict. Based on the liberal peace paradigm, it concentrates on the development of African-based policy initiatives for conflict resolution, engages in political mediation and has deployed numerous Peace Support Operations (PSOs) alone and in cooperation with Regional Economic Communities on the continent. It thus, constitutes a prime example of mission-based conflict resolution which is deeply rooted in formal institutionalized organizations. The APF was established in December 2003 and replaced by the EPF in 2021. It was less driven by narrow geopolitical interests of the EU but more inspired by the idea of supporting a multilateral partner organization, the AU, and helping her to consolidate its institutional structures which gradually emerged in the first decade of the new millennium. As the APSA’s regular budget cannot sustain peace support operations, the APF became the single most important source of funding for mission deployments. Often African-led missions were deployed in advance of UN missions which prepared the ground for EU missions too. However, the APF was not only regionally confined to Africa but also constrained in what it could finance, for example, lethal equipment such as arms and ammunition was excluded because it was funded through the European Development Fund (EDF), a civilian development assistance fund and not a dedicated budget for military operations (APF annual report 2017). Funds also had to be distributed exclusively through the AU, which disadvantaged alternative formats and added an extra bureaucratic layer in the case of deployment of a non-AU institution. As the APSA operates with a set number of sub-regional organizations in addition to the AU, but conflicts may not neatly fall within any of these sub-regional settings or countries may not want an AU mission on their territory, the APSA may not automatically or fully be involved in conflict resolution.

In contrast, the EPF not only has a global orientation but also lifts restrictions on financing lethal equipment and is offering much needed flexibility in providing security assistance. This flexibility can be seen as a pragmatic adjustment to external needs but also allows the EU to act more strategically and quicker. For example, African peace missions started to be organized outside the formal framework of the APSA in the form military AHCs but could not be support by the APF (Brosig and Karlsrud, 2024; Karlsrud and Reykers, 2025). Additionally, Russia’s increasing engagement in Africa offering unconditional and direct access to military equipment constitutes an alternative to the traditional multilateral mission-based approach undercutting the role played by the UN, AU or EU. The EPF offering the opportunity to directly support governments and AHCs is clearly an endorsement of a more geopolitically engaged EU in foreign and security policy in Africa but also beyond (Reykers et al. forthcoming). As mentioned, the EPF has no geographical restrictions.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the EPF became centrally important for channelling military support to Ukraine and providing security assistance to the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. While support for Ukraine is mainly bilateral, the war also led to the establishment of new missions such the EU Support Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) providing training for Ukrainian soldiers in 24 EU countries with a budget of €106m as well as the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) a civilian mission targeting hybrid security threats (see annex).

The war also led to a massive budget increase from €5.69bn to €17bn. €10.6bn are earmarked for Ukraine. The remaining €6.4bn have been assigned to cover common costs of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and assistance for the armed forces of partner countries (Bilquin, 2025). Table 2 offers an overview of all EPF funded measures until April 2025.

Region	Recipient	Amount (EUR)
Eastern Neighbourhood	Ukrainian Armed Forces	3.600.000.000
	Ukrainian Armed Forces	2.000.000.000
	Ukrainian Armed Forces	255.000.000
	Ukrainian Armed Forces	230.000.000
	Ukrainian Armed Forces	31.000.000
	Georgian Defence Forces	62.750.000
	Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova	197.000.000
	Armenian Armed Forces	10.000.000

<i>Western Balkans</i>	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	10.000.000
	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	10.000.000
	Balkan Medical Task Force	6.000.000
	Army of North Macedonia	38.000.000
	Albanian Armed Forces	28.000.000
	Armed Forces of Montenegro	6.000.000
<i>Middle East</i>	Lebanese Armed Forces	82.000.000
	Jordanian Armed Forces	20.250.000
	Egyptian Armed Forces	20.000.000
<i>Africa</i>	Mozambican Armed Forces / EU Training Mission in Mozambique	89.000.000
	Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique	40.000.000
	Armed Forces of Mauritania	47.000.000
	Ghana Armed Forces	33.250.000
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	20.000.000
	Republic of Congo	5.000.000
	Beninese Armed Forces	41.750.000
	Gulf of Guinea (Ghana and Cameroon)	21.000.000
	Somali National Army	1.000.000
	Kenya Defence Forces	20.000.000
	Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire	15.000.000
	Gulf of Guinea (Benin)	5.000.000
	Senegalese Armed Forces	10.000.000

	Armed Forces of Cabo Verde	12.000.000
	Togolese Armed Forces	10.000.000
	Djibouti Armed Forces	10.000.000
African PSOs	African Union (Transition) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS)	340.000.000
	Somali National Army	89.000.000
	Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram	130.000.000
	G5 Sahel Joint Force	17.000.000
	Southern African Development Community	15.000.000

Data drawn from: Brosig et al. (forthcoming).

The above table visibly illustrates a shift away from the mission-based conflict resolution approach of the APF, to strengthening armed forces in select countries and support of military AHCs. The main focus areas are Eastern Europe with Ukraine at the centre, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. Support for classical peacekeeping has vanished nearly completely. While table 2 contains a section for African PSOs most of them (Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, G5 Sahel Joint-Force, SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)) are rather AHCs than AU-led missions. Furthermore, the G5 Sahel Joint-Force disintegrated internally following military coups, SAMIM ended in 2024 and the AU mission in Somalia is undergoing an extended transition and gradual winding down phase. Likewise, EU missions in the Sahel closed down.

In this context, it is important to note, that with Ukraine military support dominating the total numbers, this has not been to the detriment of Africa. Funding levels for the continent remain stable. To the opposite, through the war in Ukraine, the tool of EU funded military assistance became politically normalized and has contributed to a consolidation if not potential expansion into of this instrument.

In sum, the EU's prime funding instrument follows the search and surge cost model introduced earlier. There is a visible focus on lower degrees of formalization and direct technical support, while multilateral mission support is almost exclusively concentrating on funding and equipping military AHCs. These appear as more agile, less formalistic and flexible to use. Thus, they come with low surge costs. Although the EU itself has not turned away from setting up missions, they remain small and technical in size. The end of deploying comprehensive and large peacekeeping missions by the UN raises

a number of questions for the EU. Can small scale and task-specific missions provide enough value on their own, to which extent is the emphasis on technical solutions neglecting or undermining normative projects such as the liberal peace paradigm and how can AHCs be designed to complement but not compete with established international organizations such as the UN or AU? The following section addresses these and other issues.

# A Mixed Mission Approach<sup>8</sup>

There are distinct benefits associated with both the mission and the ad hoc models. We will now look closer at these. AHCs have low search and surge costs and may be more effective in the short term but have less input legitimacy as a function of their limited membership and operation outside of established procedural and normative pathways. In the context of mission-based conflict resolution input legitimacy refers to adherence to formalized scripts such as multilateral decision-making procedures and implementation of collectively endorsed policy programmes. They can be seen as coming with a legitimacy bonus because at their core, they are oriented to be participatory, inclusive, transparent, accountable and lasting.

Furthermore, institutional missions have the benefit of accumulated expertise and the bureaucratic and organizational capacity to deploy complex missions into some of the world's most challenging logistical theatres. Furthermore, the AU, the EU, NATO and the UN are all learning organizations with bureaucratic capacity to learn, build and develop a set of doctrines and guidelines that guide their operations which are continuously updated (see e.g. Benner et al. 2011, Smith 2017, Faleg 2017, Hardt 2017, Dijkstra et al. 2019, Meyer et al. 2024). Institutional missions also have solid oversight and accountability frameworks developed to plan, monitor and evaluate practices at various levels of the organizations. These cover human rights, economic spending, human resources and so forth (see e.g. UN 2015; EC 2023). Both institutional learning and accountability are major deficits of ad hoc coalitions. They are rarely anchored in an overall strategy agreed by the major stakeholders to the conflict, and lessons are not institutionalised, if at all recorded.

Institutional missions, by necessity of their institutional anchoring, facilitate a strategic discussion among key regional and global stakeholders about ends and means. What is the desired end state, and by which means should this be reached? What other complimentary development, humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts are undertaken by a variety of actors in the same operational theatre? How do these integrate, overlap or compete, and through which mechanisms? The potential benefits of combining institutions with coalitions is thus obvious, but easier said than done as they also imply higher search and surge costs.

The EU should aim to leverage the benefits of both these types of missions by providing financial incentives to facilitate integration of institutional missions and AHCs, adapted to the context on the ground. Reykers and Karlsrud has developed a typology of scenarios divided into three broad categories – “stand-alone deployments, sequential deployments and parallel deployments, which can be subdivided into loosely integrated and fully integrated parallel deployments” (2025: 2095). Stand-alone deployments are

---

<sup>8</sup> This section draws on the typology developed by Karlsrud and Reykers (2025).

AHCs deployed to theatres where there is no formal connection to institutional missions or where these are deployed in the absence of institutional missions. Sequential deployments are coalitions which are replaced or transitioned into institutional missions, as e.g. was the case with the European force in Chad in 2008 that was transitioned into a UN mission, and the AU force in Mali in 2012 that also was morphed into a UN mission. Finally, an example of a loosely integrated missions is e.g. the G5 Sahel JF that was provided support by the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali.

Stand-alone and sequential deployments (of ad hoc coalitions) have low surge and search costs, and give immediate return on political capital, but invariably suffer from being unable to make a lasting impact on the conflict dynamic on the ground. Loosely and fully integrated deployments can realize stronger synergies but also have higher search and surge costs. AHCs as they are not permanent institutions can be seen as having only a mid-range lifecycle because of their task-specific and quick nature, they are an attractive instrument for rapid crisis response. However, this initial advantage can erode which requires a shift from stand alone to a sequential, parallel or hybrid form of integration into existing institutional framework over time. Steps in that direction can entail, the formal endorsement, authorisation, mandating by the UN or regional organization, and/or the borrowing or full adoption of policy programmes from such organizations. Alternatively, parts or all of its operations can be taken over by an organization or the AHC can be converted into an organization. Finally, AHCs can simply be dissolved, should they lose their initial advantage.

# Conclusions

Multilateral conflict resolution is undergoing tectonic change and international conflict management is moving towards a loosely organized system, or “conflict management à la carte” (Karlsrud and Reykers 2025: 2091). Institutional frameworks are out of vogue in a period of rapidly increased demand, judging by the count of 61 active state-based conflicts in the world (Rustad 2025). The gridlock in multilateralism has led to a steep and continuing decline in institutional missions with a concurrent increase in the use of AHCs. We are, as Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada stated, “in a new age of variable geometry” (2025), moving from institutions to coalitions. This trend is not limited to international security, but can be witnessed in global health, trade and digitalization, as can be seen when reading the other reports produced by the NAVIGATOR project.

The differentiation in the origin, membership and accountability structures between coalitions and institutional missions makes goal conflicts high impossible to avoid, leading to secondary transaction costs for the EU when defending the support of a coalition in multilateral bodies such as the UN Security Council or at the AU Peace and Security Council. The (perceived) withdrawal of resources from these institutions to coalitions also leads to increased transaction costs, and the deinstitutionalization of these institutions (Brosig and Karlsrud 2024), building down their institutional capacity to mitigate and respond to conflicts.

Nevertheless, in the current transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order, the trend towards coalitions is rational. A geopolitical EU should, when possible, seek to integrate these coalitions according to the political alignment of the stakeholders of a given conflict to ensure that responses to conflicts are embedded in a longer-term political strategy, while strengthening the bilateral relations with the host nation as well as the troop contributing countries of these coalitions. While AHCs are associated with more agility, a lower bureaucratic and programmatic burden as well as being delimited to select and specific tasks, they are no substitute for strategic and formalist institutional action which the mission-based approach is representing. Because of this, hybrid forms of ‘ad hocism’ and formalization are likely to co-exist. This can either be brandished as fragmentation of order or comes with the opportunity to re-design it. The EU does have the necessary resources for shaping this process to its advantage.

# References

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Benjamin Faude (2021) "Choosing Low-Cost Institutions in Global Governance." *International Theory* 13(3) 397–426. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971920000202>.

Afrobarometer (2025). "Maliens welcome influence of Russia, China, and AES, side with Russia on the Ukraine war". 13 Nov. 2025. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad1077-maliens-welcome-influence-of-russia-china-and-aes-side-with-russia-on-the-ukraine-war/>

Benner, Thorsten, Mergenthaler, Stephan and Rotmann (2011). *The new world of UN peace operations: learning to build peace?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Bilquin, Bruno (2025). "European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only." European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, 28 April 2025. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/772833/EPRS\\_BRI\(2025\)772833\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/772833/EPRS_BRI(2025)772833_EN.pdf)

Brosig, Malte, Karlsrud, John, Reykers, Yf (forthcoming) "The European Peace Facility and the EU's Evolving Role in International Peace and Security" *Journal of European Public Policy*.

Brosig, Malte (2026). "Navigating Great Power Rivalry in the UN Security Council: A European Perspective" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 31(1), forthcoming.

Brosig, Malte and Karlsrud, John (2024). "How Ad Hoc Coalitions Deinstitutionalize International Institutions" *International Affairs*, 100(2), 771-790.

Brosig, Malte and Sempijja, Norman (2018). "Does Peacekeeping Reduce Violence? Assessing Comprehensive Security of Contemporary Peace Operations in Africa". *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 7(1): 4, 1–23.

Brosig, Malte (2014). "EU Peacekeeping in Africa: From Niche Selection to Interlocking Security Governance" *International Peacekeeping* 21(1), 74-90.

Brosig, Malte (2013). "The African Security Regime Complex: Exploring Converging Actors and Policies" *African Security* 6(3-4) 171-190.

Carney, Mark (2025) "The world is in a new age of variable geometry, says Mark Carney," *The Economist*, 12 November 2025. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2025/11/12/the-world-is-in-a-new-age-of-variable-geometry-says-mark-carney>

Cheeseman, Nic, Bianchi, Matías and Cyr, Jennefer (2026). "The Illiberal International Authoritarian Cooperation Is Reshaping the Global Order" *Foreign Affairs* Jan/Feb 2026. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/illiberal-international-cheeseman-bianchi-cyr>

Council of the EU (2021). Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528. Official Journal of the European Union, L 102/14.

Die Zeit, „Johann Wadepful baut Hunderte Stellen im Auswärtigen Amt ab“ 25. November 2025. <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2025-11/auswaertiges-amt-umstrukturierung-berlin>

Dijkstra, Hylke, Petrov, Petar and Mahr, Ewa (2019). “Learning to deploy civilian capabilities: how the United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union have changed their crisis management institutions.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 54(4), 524–543. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718823814>

European Commission, African Peace Facility Annual Report 2017. [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-09/apf-ar-2017-180711\\_en.pdf](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-09/apf-ar-2017-180711_en.pdf)

European Commission (2018). A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020. Commission Communication, Brussels, 14 February 2018. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0098&from=EN>

European Commission (2023) European Union's human rights and international humanitarian law due diligence policy on security sector support to third parties (EU HRDDP). Brussels: European Union.

Fath, Julia Lacher, Wolfram and Verhoeven, Ann-Marie (2025). “The Changing Face of Foreign Intervention in African Conflicts” in Hackenesch, Christine Heidland, Tobias and Tull Denis Tull (eds.), *Leverage and Limits: What African Actors Make of the New Multipolarity* 13-21. [https://www.megatrends-afrika.de/assets/afrika/publications/MTA\\_working\\_paper/MegatrendsAfrika\\_WP21\\_bro\\_vea\\_02102025\\_1040\\_Web\\_KORREKTUR.pdf](https://www.megatrends-afrika.de/assets/afrika/publications/MTA_working_paper/MegatrendsAfrika_WP21_bro_vea_02102025_1040_Web_KORREKTUR.pdf)

Fortna, Virginia (2008). *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton University Press.

Dersso, Solomon and Hailu, Tefesehet (2025). “African Union risks betraying the raison d'être of its existence, bequeathing a fragmented continent burdened with conflicts” *Amani Africa*, Ideas Indaba, 15 Sep. 2025. <https://amaniafrica-et.org/african-union-risks-betraying-the-raison-detre-of-its-existence-bequeathing-a-fragmented-continent-burdened-with-conflicts/>

European Union External Action Service (EEAS). “Missions and Operations” [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en)

Faleg, Giovanni (2017). *The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: learning communities in international organizations*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Faude, Benjamin and Karlsrud, John (2025) "The Institutional Dynamics of Global Governance in Hard Times, Innovation or Decline?" *Ethics & International Affairs*, 39(2): 114-129. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679425100154>

Gowan, Richard (2025). "Doing less with less at the UN" *International Crisis Group, Commentary* 16 May 2025. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global-united-states/doing-less-with-less-un>

Hale, Thomas (2024). *Long Problems, Climate Change and the Challenge of Governing Across Time*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Hardt, Heidi (2017). "How NATO remembers: explaining institutional memory in NATO in crisis management." *European Security* 26(1), 120–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2016.1263944>

Hegre, Håvard, Hultman, Lisa, Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv (2019). "Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations." *The Journal of Politics*, 81(1), 215-232. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700203>

Håkansson, Calle (2024). "The Ukraine war and the emergence of the European commission as a geopolitical actor." *Journal of European Integration*, 46(1), 25–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2239998>

Karlsrud, John and Reykers, Yf (2025). "Integrating ad hoc coalitions in international conflict management," *International Affairs*, 101(6), 2085–2101.

Keohane, Robert (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39–51.

Kurtz, Gerrit (2025). "Protecting Civilians in Sudan" *SWP Comment* 2025/C 31, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/protecting-civilians-in-sudan>

Lundgren, Magnus, Oksamytna, Kseniya & Coleman, Katharina (2020). „Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response." *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(4), 671-686. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320940763>

Maglia, Cristiana, Karlsrud, John, & Reykers, Yf (2025). "Military Ad Hoc Coalitions and Their Role in International Conflict Management: Insights from the ADHOCISM Dataset" *International Peacekeeping*, 32(3), 358–386. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2024.2445113>

Meyer, Christoph O., Van Osch, Ton and Reykers, Yf (2024). "From EU battlegroups to Rapid Deployment Capacity: learning the right lessons?" *International Affairs* 100(1), 181–201. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iia247>

Mogherini, Federica (2017). Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the "Building on vision, forward to action: delivering on EU security and defence" event, Brussels, 13 December 2017. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/37355\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/37355_en)

Ricard, Maxime, Julien Antouly, and Yvan Guichaoua (2025). "Anatomy of a Fall: Understanding France's Reluctant Retreat from Central Sahel." *Geopolitics*, 1–32. doi:10.1080/14650045.2024.2446437.

Pierson, Paul (1996). "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis" *Comparative Political Studies* 29(2): 123 – 162.

Reykers, Yf, Karlsrud, John, Brosig, Malte, Hofmann, Stephanie, Maglia, Cristiana, Rieker, Pernille (2023). "Ad hoc coalitions in global governance: short-notice, task- and time-specific cooperation" *International Affairs* 99(2), 727-745.

Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2025 and the Year Ahead" 30 December 2025.

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-01/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2025-and-the-year-ahead.php>

Sending, Ole Jacob, Seabrooke, Leonard, Karlsrud, John (2024). "Search Costs in Global Governance" <https://eunav.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/NAVIGATOR-working-paper-Search-Costs-in-Global-Governance.pdf>

Smith, Michael E. (2017). *Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy: capacity-building, experiential learning, and institutional change*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Snidal, Duncan (2002). "Rational Choice and International Relations" in *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by B. A. Simmons, W. Carlsnaes & T. Risse. London: Sage. 73-93.

Tallberg, Jonas (2002). "Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?" *West European Politics*, 25 (1): 23-46.

Tull, Denis (2023). "UN Peacekeeping in Africa. The End of a Cycle?" *Megatrends Afrika*, Working Paper 7, Berlin: August 2023. [https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/MTA\\_working\\_paper/MTA\\_WP\\_07\\_Tull\\_UN\\_Peacekeeping.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/MTA_working_paper/MTA_WP_07_Tull_UN_Peacekeeping.pdf)

Tull, Denis (2023b). "VN-Krisenmanagement in Mali Warum MINUSMA noch ein Jahr bleiben sollte" *SWP-Aktuell* 2023/A 22, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/vn-krisenmanagement-in-mali>

United Nations (2015) *Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces*. New York: United Nations.

Vabulas, Fecilitas, and Snidal, Duncan (2020). "Cooperation under autonomy: Building and analyzing the Informal Intergovernmental Organizations 2.0 dataset." *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(4), 859-869. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320943920>

Vorrath, Judith (2024). "UN Arms Embargos under scrutiny" *SWP Research Paper* 12, Berlin, September 2024.

The White House, Presidential Actions, “Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States” 7. Jan. 2026.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-conventions-and-treaties-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/>

# Annex

Table 1 Currently deployed EU missions in chronological order

<b>Mission name</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Budget (annual common costs)</b>	<b>Size</b>
<i>EUMAM Mozambique: EU Military Assistance Mission</i>	1. Sep. 2024	Military (land-based)	14.1m	226
<i>EUNAVFOR: ASPIDES</i>	19. Feb. 2024	Military (naval)	8m	flexible
<i>EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova</i>	May 31, 2023	Civilian	6.6m	72
<i>EUM Armenia: EU Mission in Armenia</i>	20 Feb. 2023	Civilian	10.2m	209
<i>EUMAM Ukraine: EU Assistance Mission Ukraine</i>	15 Nov. 2022	Military (land-based)	106.7m	No fixed size
<i>EUNAVFOR MED IRINI: EU Naval Force IRINI</i>	Mar 31, 2020	Military (naval)	16.9m	120
<i>EUAM RCA: EU Advisory Mission in Central African Republic</i>	9. Dec. 2019	Civilian	28.4m	66
<i>EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq</i>	17. Oct. 2017	Civilian	33m	120
<i>EUTM RCA: EU Training Mission in Central African Republic</i>	Jul 16, 2016	Military (land-based)	5.84m	170
<i>EUCAP Somalia: EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia</i>	12 Dec. 2015	Civilian	41.5m	222
<i>EUCAP SAHEL MALI: EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali</i>	Jan 15, 2015	Civilian	33.2m	146

<i>EUAM UKRAINE: EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine</i>	1. Dec. 2014	Civilian	60m	437
<i>EUBAM Libya: EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya</i>	2013	Civilian	26m	91
<i>EUTM Somalia: EU Training Mission in Somalia</i>	Apr 7, 2010	Military (land-based)	14.6m	200
<i>EUNAVFOR: ATALANTA</i>	10. Nov. 2010	Military (naval)	6.4m	app. 700
<i>EUMM Georgia: The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia</i>	15 Sep. 2008	Civilian	23.5m	200
<i>EULEX Kosovo: EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</i>	4 Feb. 2008	Civilian	82m	503
<i>EUPOL COPPS: EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the occupied Palestinian territory</i>	1 Jan. 2006	Civilian	13.3m	106
<i>EU BAM RAFAH: EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point</i>	25 Nov. 2005	Civilian		20
<i>EUFOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Military Operation ALTHEA</i>	2 Dec. 2004	Military (land-based)		600

Source: author calculation, data drawn from the EU External Action Service (EEAS) website: [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en) accessed 17 December 2025.

Project acronym:	NAVIGATOR
Project full title:	The EU Navigating Multilateral Cooperation
Grant agreement no.:	101094394
Type of action:	Research and innovation
Project start date:	01.03.2023
Project duration:	48 months
Call topic:	HORIZON-CL2-2022-DEMOCRACY-01-09
Project website:	<a href="http://eunav.eu/">http://eunav.eu/</a>
Document:	Coalition Defies Mission. Multilateral Conflict Resolution at Times of Geopolitical Contestation"
Deliverable number:	D8.2
Deliverable title:	Coalition Defies Mission. Multilateral Conflict Resolution at Times of Geopolitical Contestation"
Due date of deliverable:	28 February 2026
Actual submission date:	27 February 2026
Editors:	Malte Brosig, John Karlsrud
Authors:	Malte Brosig, John Karlsrud
Reviewers:	Ole Jacob Sending
Participating beneficiaries:	Whole NAVIGATOR Consortium
Work Package no.:	8
Work Package title:	Security
Work Package leader:	Malte Brosig
Work Package participants:	Maastricht University, Norwegian Insitute for International Affairs and University of the Witwatersrand
Estimated person-months for deliverable:	6
Dissemination level:	PU - Public
Nature:	Report
Version:	1
Draft/Final:	Final
No of pages (including cover):	30
Keywords:	EU Security Governance, Search Costs, European Peace Facility, Multilateralism, Ad hoc coalitions (AHCs)

# About NAVIGATOR

NAVIGATOR is a 4-year research project set to examine how the EU shall navigate the increasingly complex – and conflict-laden – institutional spaces of global governance to advance a rules-based international order. What factors should be emphasized when considering which institutions to strengthen, which to reform, and which to by-pass when revitalising multilateralism?

NAVIGATOR's main objective is to answer these questions and deliver a ready-to-use "search mechanism" and associated pathways of action that the EU and its member states can use as it seeks to strengthen a rules-based international order.

To achieve this, NAVIGATOR comprises a strong, global and inter-disciplinary team of researchers that explores institutional variation on six policy issues – climate change, digitalisation, finance/tax, health, migration and security – to identify what institutional mixes that enables the EU to have optimal impact in a given policy issue.

This project receives funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under the Call HORIZON-CL2-2021-DEMOCRACY-01 – Grant agreement n°101061621

© 2026 NAVIGATOR

Our publications are available via the project website: <https://www.eunav.eu/>

---

All rights, amongst which the copyright, on the materials described in this document rest with the original authors of the text, except where referenced. Without prior permission in writing from the authors and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), this document may not be used, in whole or in part, for the lodging of claims, for conducting proceedings, for publicity and/or for the benefit or acquisition in a more general sense.

The European Commission's support does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which only reflect the views of the author(s). The Commission is not responsible for any use of the information contained therein.



## Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

C J Hambros plass 2D

0164 Oslo

Norway

Contact: [jka@nupi.org](mailto:jka@nupi.org)

 <https://eunav.eu/>

 EU NAVIGATOR



# NAVIGATOR